Archive for category technology

Who Competes With Google Search? Just Amazon, Apple And Facebook

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is in the final stages of conducting its Google investigation. As the agency contemplates whether Google is a monopolist in the ill-defined market for 29578v7-max-450x450search, they may find the competitive ground has shifted beneath their feet in just the 15 months since they began investigating. While a year or two ago, Google’s main competition in search might have been Bing and Yahoo, today it’s Apple and Amazon, and tomorrow it may be Facebook. The market is almost certainly broader than general search engines as we normally think of them.

Just last week, the New York Times ran a story explaining that Google and Amazon are “at war to become the pre-eminent online mall.” The story cited survey data from two consultancies that should give the antitrust authority pause:

  • Forrester Research found that a third of online users started their product searches on Amazon compared to 13 percent who started their search from a traditional search site; and
  • comScore found that product searches on Amazon have grown 73 percent over the last year while shopping searches on Google have been flat.

These impressive statistics suggest that Google lacks market power in a critical segment of search—namely, product searches. Even though searches for items such as power tools or designer jeans account for only 10 to 20 percent of all searches, they are clearly some of the most important queries for search engines from a business perspective, as they are far easier to monetize than informational queries like “Kate Middleton.”

One senses that the FTC has not focused much on competition from Amazon in product search, or that they even think of Amazon as a search engine. Instead, antitrust agencies around the globe have fixated on helping middlemen comparison-shopping sites such as Nextag and PriceGrabber, most of whom charge retailers for listings. Google is taking heat from comparison sites for doing the same thing because Google is perceived to be the most important source for online shoppers. That regulators are willing to breathe life into these intermediaries implies they do not recognize the platform-based competition between Google and Amazon for product searches.

Amazon is not the only behemoth that competes with Google for search. Apple’s Siri can do search and whole lot more, from helping Samuel L. Jackson design the perfect dinner to making John Malkovich laugh to helping Martin Scorsese maneuver through New York. As search evolves from links into answers, services like Siri become highly valuable. And the ITunes App Store represents the launching pad for many searches that would otherwise start on Google. A couple in Virginia that enjoys winery tours might begin their search by installing “Virginia Wine in My Pocket” or “Virginia Wineries” on their iPhone rather than search the web. In March of this year, Apple announced that more than 25 billion apps had been downloaded from its App Store by the users of the more than 315 million iPhone, iPad, and iPod touch devices worldwide. One wonders whether any of these downloads are being counted by the FTC in their calculations of Google’s market share.

And now Facebook is getting into search. At a Disrupt conference last week, Mark Zuckerberg explained that search engines are evolving into places where users go for answers, and that Facebook is uniquely positioned to compete in that market: “And when you think about it from that perspective, Facebook is pretty uniquely positioned to answer a lot of the questions that people have. So what sushi restaurants have my friends gone to in New York in the past six months and liked? . . . . These are queries that you could potentially do at Facebook if we build out this system that you just couldn’t do anywhere else.”

It may not be natural to associate Amazon (an online retailer), Apple (a device maker), and Facebook (a social media site) with search, but in the technology industry, your next competitive threat can come from anywhere. Monopoly and the kind of robust platform competition between Apple, Amazon, Google, and Facebook are mutually exclusive portraits of reality. Will the FTC turn a blind eye toward this advanced form of competition?

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When Is Deception an Antitrust Offense? The FTC’s Unorthodox Case Against Google

Last week, the FTC hired outside litigator Beth Wilkinson to lead an investigation into Google’s conduct, which some in the press have interpreted as a grave sign for the search company. The FTC is reportedly interested in pursuing Google under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits a firm from engaging in “unfair methods of competition.” Along with Bob Litan, who served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division during the Microsoft investigation, I have penned a short paper on the FTC’s seemingly unorthodox Section 5 case against Google. (Disclosure: This paper was commissioned by Google.)

Litan and I explore a few possible theories of harm under a hypothetical Section 5 case and find them wanting, including (1) claims that specialized search results (such as flight, shopping or map results) “unfairly” harm the independent specialized search websites like Kayak (travel) or MapQuest (mapping and directions), or (2) assertions that Google allegedly has “deceived” users or websites by seemingly reneging on pledges not to favor its own sites. For the sake of brevity, I focus on the FTC’s potential deception theory here, and leave it to interested reader to pursue the “unfairness” theory in the paper.

Deception of Users

The alleged bases of Google’s alleged deception are generic statements that Google made, either in its initial public offering (IPO) or on its website, about Google’s attitude toward users leaving the site. The provision of a lawful service, specialized search, launched several years after the IPO statement certainly cannot be deceptive. To conclude that it is, and more importantly, to prevent the company from offering innovations in search would establish a precedent that would surely punish innovation throughout the rest of the economy.

As for the mission statement that the company wants users to get off the site as quickly as possible, it is just that, a mission statement. Users do not go to the mission statement when they search; they go to the Google site itself. Users cannot possibly be harmed even if this particular statement in the company’s mission were untrue. Moreover, if the problem lies in that statement, then any remedy should be directed at amending that statement. There is no justification for the Commission to hamper Google’s specialized search services themselves or to dictate where Google must display them.

Deception of Rivals

An alternative theory suggests that Google deceived its rivals, reducing innovation among independent websites. In a February 2012 paper delivered to the OECD, Tim Wu explained that competition law can be used to “increase the costs of exclusion,” which if successful, would promote innovation among application providers. Wu argued that “oversight of platforms is conceptually similar” to oversight of standard-setting organizations (SSOs). He offers a hypothetical case in which a platform owner “broadly represents to the world that he maintains an open and transparent innovation platform,” gains a monopoly position based on those representations, and then begins to exclude applications “that might themselves serve as platforms.” Once the industry has committed to a private platform, Wu argues, the platform owner “earns oversight of its practices from that point onward.”

So has Google earned itself oversight due to its alleged deception? Google is not perceived by web designers as providing a platform for all companies to have equal footing. Websites’ rankings in Google’s search results vary tremendously over time; no publisher could reasonably rely on any particular ranking on Google. To the contrary, websites want their presence to be known to any and all search engines. That specialized search sites did not base their business plans on Google’s commitment to openness is what distinguishes Google’s platform from Microsoft’s platform in the 1990s. To Wu’s credit, he does not mention Google in this section of the paper; the only platforms mentioned are those of Apple, Android, and Microsoft.

It is even more of a stretch to analogize Google’s conduct to that in the FTC’s Rambus case. Unlike websites that do not depend on a Google “standard”–the website can be accessed by users from any search engine, or through direct navigation–computer memory chips must be compatible with a variety of computers, which requires that chip producers develop a common set of standards for performance and interoperability. According to the FTC, Rambus exploited this reliance by, among other things, not disclosing to chip makers that it had additional divisional patent applications in process. That specialized search sites did not make “irreversible technological” investments based on Google’s commitment to a common standard is what distinguishes Google’s platform from SSOs.

The Freedom to Innovate

A change in a business model cannot be a legitimate basis for a Section 5 case because a firm cannot be expected to know how the world is going to unfold at its inception. A lot can change in a decade. Consumers’ taste for the product can change. Technology can change. Business models are required to adapt to such change; else they die. There should be no requirement that once a firm writes a mission statement, it be held to that statement forever. What if Google failed to anticipate the role of specialized search in 2004? Presumably, Google failed to anticipate a lot of things, but that should not be the basis for denying its entry into ancillary services or expanding its core offerings. As John Maynard Keynes famously replied to a criticism during the Great Depression of having changed his position on monetary policy: “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do sir?” If Google exposes itself to increased oversight for merely changing its mind, then other technology firms might think twice before innovating. And that would be a horrible consequence to the FTC’s exploration of alternative antitrust theories.

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New Study Links Wireless Adoption to Jobs: It’s All About the Spectrum (and Siri)

Economists recognize that the source of sustainable, private-sector jobs is investment. Due to measurement problems with investment data, however, it is sometimes easier to link a byproduct of investment—namely, adoption of the technology made possible by the investment—to job creation. This is precisely what economists Rob Shapiro and Kevin Hassett have done in their new study on the employment effects of wireless investments.

Shapiro and Hassett credit the nation’s upgrade of wireless broadband infrastructure from second-generation (2G) to third-generation (3G) technology with generating over one million jobs between 2006 and 2011. To demonstrate that adoption of 3G handsets “caused” job creation in an econometric sense, the authors studied the relationship between the change in a state’s employment and the cumulative penetration of cell phone technologies. According to their econometric model, every 10 percentage point increase in the penetration of a new generation of cell phones in a given quarter causes between a 0.05 and 0.07 percentage point increase in employment growth in the following three quarters.

How reasonable are these results? In 2010, Bob Crandall and I estimated that investment in second-generation broadband infrastructure of roughly $30 billion per year, including wireless infrastructure, sustained roughly 500,000 jobs between 2006 and 2009. We further estimated that spillover effects in other industries that exploit broadband technology could sustain another 500,000, bringing the total job effect close to one million jobs per year. Although Shapiro’s and Hassett’s estimates (based on wireless deployment only) significantly exceed ours (based on all broadband deployment), their estimate is not outside the realm of the possibility.

Crandall, Lehr, and Litan (2007) also conducted a regression analysis using state-level broadband penetration data from 2003-2005 to estimate job effects. They projected that for every one percentage point increase in broadband penetration in a state, employment increases by 0.2 to 0.3 percent per year. On a national level, their results imply an increase of approximately 300,000 jobs per year per one-percentage-point increase in broadband penetration. Once again, Shapiro’s and Hassett’s estimates are consistent with this prior work.

Scholars may differ on the precise way to measure the employment effects, but that debate misses the more important policy point—namely, that broadband technologies generally and wireless broadband in particular have become a vital engine of job creation. The observed correlation between wireless adoption and employment is not accidental: To induce customers to adopt the coolest handset, firms must continuously invest in the next generation of network and device technologies. And these costly investments sustain jobs.

Moreover, contrary to the FCC’s opinion in its 15th annual wireless competition report, private industry’s sustained and widespread investment in new wireless broadband technologies is consistent with the sector being intensely competitive. Industry critics have decried such evidence, arguing instead that the industry is in the death grip of monopolists. Although a monopolist may have an incentive to innovate to protect against a future threat, firms in a competitive industry have incentives to invest and innovate as a way to protect against losing market share today.

Policymakers should ask themselves this question: Why would wireless carriers continually invest billions of dollars on next-generation technologies if they could sit back and exploit their alleged monopoly rents? Experience and common sense tell us that in fact, companies in this space are not behaving like monopolists. Rather, wireless providers of all stripes are desperately trying to distinguish themselves from their rivals. Wireless tablets and phones are driving demand for more and faster wireless broadband, while spectrum-devouring apps like Siri have captured the imagination of millions. The wireless arms race is on, and the U.S. economy stands to benefit directly as wireless companies try to outmaneuver one another with the fastest networks, coolest devices, and deepest array of killer apps.

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